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ABSTRACT
As the prospect of self-authored human extinction increasingly appears as a plausible scenario of 
human futures, a growing number of efforts aim at comprehending it as the prospect of the world without 
us. Patrícia Vieira convincingly shows in her essay on utopia and dystopia in the Anthropocene that 
utopianism has become a prominent interpretive strategy to render the possibility of human extinction 
meaningful. This brief reflection argues against the feasibility of considering the world without us in 
utopian terms. It identifies three tacit assumptions in utopian interpretations of our disappearance: they 
(1) take for granted that prospects of human extinction and post-apocalyptic themes are of the same 
kind; (2) presume that the biological character of human extinction needs no special attention when 
situating it with the social character of utopian thinking; and (3) remain committed to an anthropocentric 
view in assuming that we are the ones to attribute meaning even to the world defined by our absence. 
In challenging these assumptions, the essay develops three theses on the relation of utopia and the 
prospect of the world without us.
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Utopia without us?
Can there be a utopia without us? Certainly, there can be a world without us, just as well as there was a world before us. Alan Weisman’s The World without Us (2007) is arguably the best example of this. It turned the prospect of human 
extinction into the most powerful imaginary designed to help us better understand how 
we have been transforming the planet lately. The thought experiment to picture what 
happens to the planet and human-made artifacts after we disappear can be immensely 
stimulating. For one thing, it inspired Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009) to reflect on how the 
recognition that we are living in the Anthropocene (CRUTZEN, 2002; STEFFEN et al. 
2011) – that is, living in the yet unformalized geological epoch when human activity 
transforms the Earth conceived of as a system of interacting physical and social 
processes – poses a challenge to historical thinking.
Linked with the Anthropocene, the world without us appears as a paradox. On 
the one hand, the world without us as an anthropocenic prospect depicts our non-
existence and absence as a plausible future scenario. On the other hand, human non-
existence is a result of our own activity; it is the prospect of an epoch that is literally 
about an overwhelming human existence and presence, with human capacities being 
elevated even to the level of a force of nature (with the anthropos of the Anthropocene 
meaning human in Greek). However, precisely because of its paradoxical nature, the 
world without us as an Anthropocene prospect is the most instrumental in confronting 
us with ourselves, our doings, our unprecedented powers, and our boundaries – all this 
at the same time.
 With these complexities and intricacies in mind, let me rephrase the opening 
question in a slightly different way: is there any way in which the prospect of the 
world without us can be considered as utopian? This, I believe, is the most perplexing 
question posed by Patrícia Vieira’s insightful essay “Utopia and Dystopia in the Age 
of the Anthropocene.” In the coming pages, I hope to engage with this question and 
muse over the possibility of a utopian understanding of the world without us. Although 
I may end up sketching an answer other than the one she develops, I would like to 
use the words of Vieira as the point of departure (2020, p. 356), when she notes 
that utopian and dystopian thought was, up until our recent present, united in viewing 
“human disappearance from the face of Earth as an eminently negative development”.
 Vieira is right in suggesting that it is no longer self-evident that we view the 
prospect of human extinction in negative terms. And this, in fact, is not restricted to the 
Anthropocene context or to ecological and environmental futures. As Apolline Taillandier 
(2020) shows, advocates of technological futures of artificial general intelligence and 
superintelligence may consider human history as a transitional stage in a longer 
civilizational development tending towards forms of technological life. Remaining within 
the confines of modern modes of historical thinking and extending the idea of progress 
beyond the human world and at the expense of human life, technological futures can 
equally fuel an imagination that is no longer gloomy but sometimes even enthusiastic 
about the prospect of a world without us.
 Yet there is a certain obscurity about the most decisive aspect of futures of 
human non-existence. For the possibility of viewing human extinction as something 
not negative does not necessarily mean viewing it as something positive, let alone, 
something utopian. There are degrees and shades in the recent upsurge of thinking 
about a world without us in terms other than negative, and it seems to me that 
sometimes Vieira herself is hesitant to attribute explicit utopianism to the very examples 
she is discussing. In commenting on the emergence of the practice of contemplating 
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human extinction, Mark Jendrysik (2011) seems more determined in using utopia as an 
interpretive framework. Jendrysik argues that Weisman’s The World without Us (2007) 
and the documentaries it inspired – Aftermath: Population Zero (2008) and Life after 
People (2008) – are representatives of a new kind of utopianism that finds reassurance 
in imagining a future in which human self-annihilation entails the rebirth of nature. 
The significance of the imaginary is provided by earlier visions of human extinction in 
which our premature self-destruction is accompanied by the destruction of nature. The 
new utopianism, according to Jendrysik, channels utopian motives into saving at least 
nature – even at the cost of our disappearance.
I think that Vieira’s hesitation to fully give in to a utopianism of human nonexistence 
is well justified. When she asks at the end of her essay “What if we give hope a chance 
after all?” (VIEIRA, 2020, p. 362), she means that we should not dismiss scenarios of 
utopia that include humans. There is, however, another kind of hesitation apparent in 
Vieira’s essay; one that is perhaps less deliberate. At one point, Vieira (2020, p. 358) 
affirms Jendrysik’s views and states that “human society is deemed beyond repair 
and the only way of achieving utopian aspirations is to do away with Homo sapiens 
altogether.” At another point, in analysing Margaret Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy 
(2003, 2009, 2013) as her primary example, Vieira (2020, p. 360) nevertheless claims 
that when Atwood sees human extinction in terms other than catastrophic, it means 
that Atwood considers it “merely as one of the possible outcomes of our way of life, one 
of the possible answers to the question of Homo sapiens’ future”.
What Vieira seems to imply here is that the world without us, seen as a possible 
outcome in Atwood’s trilogy, is neither utopian nor dystopian. And this is the point at 
which I would like steer the question raised by Vieira into a slightly different direction 
than she does. What I want to argue for is not that we should not give up on including 
humans in utopian scenarios; instead, I want to point out that inasmuch as we think 
in terms of utopia, we cannot but stick with humans and our human values included 
in one way or another. We either necessarily uphold utopias that include humans, or 
we contemplate a world without us that is, necessarily again, also a world without our 
values – including utopianism.
To get a better grasp of what this means, consider how the detachment Vieira 
attributes to Atwood does not indicate explicit utopianism due to the lack of value 
judgements in the prospect of the world without us. A utopian world is a world infused with 
our values. Utopianism would require an evaluative judgement of betterment in one way 
or another, regardless of how one defines utopia. Cases when the future without humans 
is pictured as idyllic may provide a firmer ground for considering them as explicitly utopian 
imaginaries. With a bit of a stretch, Weisman’s book likely comes close to such an idyllic 
depiction, thanks to its vivid descriptions of how nature takes over the planet and human-
made things as soon as we no longer exist, which may indeed appear romanticized. Still, 
an idyllic future state does not necessarily imply utopian thinking, and in his essay on 
utopian prospects of human extinction Jendrysik (2011, p. 44) actually notes that “in the 
end Weisman tries to overcome the feeling that our end might be a good thing”.
 All in all, claims concerning the upsurge of a utopia without us seem a bit 
overstated. Interpretations that link human extinction and utopianism are most certainly 
right in calling attention to the increasing enthusiasm about contemplating human 
extinction in not necessarily negative terms. But sometimes they seem more eager to 
attribute a utopian character to prospects of a world without us than the imaginaries 
they interpret explicitly would.
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There are three profoundly interrelated premises at work when interpreting 
human extinction in utopian terms. Such utopian interpretations (1) take for granted 
that prospects of human extinction and post-apocalyptic themes are essentially of the 
same kind; (2) presume, consequently, that the peculiarly biological character of human 
extinction needs no special attention even when situating it with the peculiarly social 
character of utopian thinking; and (3) remain committed to an anthropocentric view in 
assuming that we are the ones vested with the capacity to attribute meaning even to 
the world defined by our absence. Although none of the three points are charges or 
accusations, I want to question them as the most profound and largely unexamined 
assumptions on which one can entertain the possibility of a utopia without us.
On the remaining pages, I will mostly – although not exclusively – argue for 
the opposite view: the impossibility of a utopia without us. In doing so, I will turn 
these assumptions upside down and shape them into three theses on the relation of 
utopia and the prospect of the world without us. Two and a half theses will concern 
the impossibility of a utopia without us, while half of the last thesis will be reserved 
to the costs of nonetheless projecting utopian thinking over the prospect of the world 
without us.
THESIS 1: POST-APOCALYPTIC THEMES OF SOCIETAL 
COLLAPSE AND PROSPECTS OF HUMAN EXTINCTION 
ARE DIFFERENT IN KIND
The world without us is typically considered to be utopian on the premise of 
a close affiliation between prospects of societal collapse and human extinction. As 
mentioned earlier, Jendrysik (2011) unpacks the latter as a variation of the better-
known theme of anthropogenic environmental catastrophe in which we bring an end 
to nature. By this logic, the significance of imagining human extinction is that it brings 
relief in assuring ourselves that nature survives us: instead of bringing nature down 
with us, our downfall means the rebirth of nature. Jendrysik measures Wiesman’s 
nonfiction of human extinction and the documentaries it inspired to literary and 
cinematic representations of societal collapse, such as Atwood’s MaddAddam trilogy, 
Cormac McCarthy’s The Road (2006) or Pixar’s Wall-E (2008). These are typically 
considered as belonging to the post-apocalyptic genre (HICKS, 2016; HORN, 2018), 
or to the more recently conceptualized climate fiction, cli-fi (WRIGHT, 2019).
In Vieira’s analysis, discussions of cli-fi and post-apocalyptic novels and cinema 
are more explicitly merged with imaginaries of the world without us. Atwood’s post-
apocalyptic trilogy with living and acting human characters – that is, strictly speaking, a 
world still with us – can become a core example of utopianism about a world without us 
by virtue of lacking a clear distinction between societal collapse and human extinction. 
And there is, in fact, nothing surprising in this. Even the newly developing expertise in 
threats to humanity – booming after John Leslie’s The End of the World: The Science 
and Ethics of Human Extinction (1996) – tends to conflate the two. To begin with, the 
definition of “existential risk” as “one where an adverse outcome would either annihilate 
Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential” 
(BOSTROM, 2002) does not distinguish categorically between the two prospects. Even 
today, the opening page of the website of The Centre for the Study of Existential Risk 
at the University of Cambridge defines its mission along similar lines by stating that “we 
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are dedicated to the study and mitigation of risks that could lead to human extinction or 
civilizational collapse”.1 The phrasing of either-or – both in Bostrom’s definition and in 
the mission statement of The Centre for the Study of Existential Risk – hints only at a 
difference of degree, in which there is the worst case scenario of human extinction and 
the second worst case scenario of “almost”.
This is not to say that there are no good reasons for discussing the two prospects 
together. For one thing, they both appear as threatening for humans. Inasmuch as the 
aim is to sustain human flourishing, the typical undesirability of both societal collapse 
and human extinction – despite some counterexamples such as the Voluntary Human 
Extinction Movement – is indeed a reasonable justification for bringing them together.2 
What I want to point out is only that, with respect to their very fundamental constitution, 
the two prospects could not look more substantially distinct.
Plainly put, the categorial distinction between prospects of societal collapse and 
human extinction is that between human existence and human non-existence. As long 
as there is but one human being roaming the Earth, surviving underground, or being 
evacuated to another planet, the prospect is just as well about human existence as 
any other visions of the future are, be they shiny or gloomy. As long as there is but one 
human survivor, the story will inevitably be about the fate of human characters or about 
the fate of humanity as such. Hence the fact that Wall-E ends on the note of humans 
returning to Earth (centuries after the human evacuation of the planet). Contrary to 
this, in prospects of human nonexistence, the fate of humanity is already decided. The 
only open question concerns what comes after, what comes in the world after us, what 
comes next in the world without us. Can it be utopia?
THESIS 2: HUMAN EXTINCTION CONCERNS US AS 
BIOLOGICAL BEINGS
The answer to the question of whether the world without us – as the world after 
us – can be utopian depends less on how exactly one defines utopia and more on 
grasping the radicality of the image of the world without us. As to the former, Vieira’s 
essay wonderfully captures the difficulties of defining utopia and maintaining utopianism 
today. Despite all difficulties, however, there is something that nevertheless seems 
integral to all kinds of temporal utopias and utopianisms, something that is integral to 
all modern utopias that moved their vision of betterment from the early modern spatial 
realm of distant places to the temporal realm of the future (KOSELLECK, 2002). It is 
the scope of their better futures: the socio-political domain.
At the centre of modern utopian thinking is the human as a social being, aiming at 
socio-political betterment over time. This remains true of even those concepts of utopia 
that deliberately intend to abstain from the inheritance of modernist assumptions, such 
as the notion of “existential utopia” that Vieira and Michael Marder advocate. In hoping 
to open the possibility of betterment over time as springing out of the actual instead of 
invoking metaphysical thinking, “existential utopia” assumes that at stake is the “very 
1 https://www.cser.ac.uk/.
2 http://vhemt.org/.
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survival” of utopia “as a pertinent category for social and political change” (MARDER; 
VIEIRA, 2011, p. xiii).
Contrary to this, prospects of human extinction in the Anthropocene are devoid 
of social content and concern the biological dying out of the human as a species. 
Remember the distinction introduced in the first thesis. The societal collapse of cli-fi 
and post-apocalyptic literature and cinema, due to its eventual focus on the fate of 
human characters or humanity as such, necessarily retains its social understanding 
of the human at least to an extent. It typically blends the social and the biological, 
depending on the severity of the existential threat. In the prospect of a world without 
us, however, there is no longer space for concerns we associate with intra-human 
relations and with the socio-political domain.
Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009, p. 212–220) realized in his first engagement with 
the Anthropocene that it demands historical studies in particular and human and social 
scientific knowledge in general to engage with species thinking – an idea that has 
its own history in biological thought (WILKINS, 2009). Chakrabarty was even aware 
that species thinking goes against the sensitivities of scholars of the human world, 
developed against the backdrop of past political misuses of a biological understanding 
of human beings. The eugenic enterprise, which, as Marius Turda (2010) argues, was 
integral even to the social project of modernity, is likely the most well-known of such past 
political misuses. But there are ways in which contemporary biological understandings 
of humans are even more imminently prone to potential political abuse. Just think 
about the manipulation and engineering of our “vital capacities” on the molecular and 
genomic levels that Nikolas Rose (2007) pictures as our recent “politics of life itself.” 
Although suspicions may reasonably arise about such developments, Rose (2007, p. 
8) does not interpret them as “the rise of a new biological and genetic determinism,” 
but as “the emergence of a new somatic ethics”. The case is not that we replace a 
social understanding of the human with a biological understanding in a purely biological 
biopolitics fuelled by technoscientific developments. Instead, the case is that that social 
and biological understandings of the human intertwine today in a new constellation in 
which humans appear as “biocultural creatures” (FROST, 2016).
Similarly, the Anthropocene challenge is not about overwriting concerns for the 
social world and a social understanding of the human with biological concerns and 
a biological understanding of the human. It is rather the demand to think on different 
scales – that of the social scale of the human world and that of the species scale of 
the natural world – and situate the collision of scales, that is, the collision of the human 
and the natural worlds in a meaningful way. For history, this means nothing other than 
the task of writing human and natural histories, and, consequently, the task of “thinking 
simultaneously on both registers, to mix together the immiscible chronologies of capital 
and species history” (CHAKRABARTY, 2009, p. 220). 
 The point I hope to prove by invoking Chakrabarty’s endeavour is not only that 
the Anthropocene challenge involves a species understanding of the human, but that 
social and biological understandings are both implied insofar as the Anthropocene 
prospect is milder than full-blown human extinction. Inasmuch as the aim is to maintain 
human existence, and inasmuch as we try to make sense of ourselves and a world that 
includes us, we necessarily think with both the social and the biological. 
But as soon as we imagine a world without us, as soon as we contemplate 
human extinction, we begin to think in terms of our biological dying out and we imagine 
a world from which we biologically disappear. Surely, from the present point of view, 
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we consider this in terms of values and value judgments. As Vieira (2020, p. 355) 
perceptively notes, the novelty in this respect is that “it is not so much that we fail 
to conjure up a good society but, rather, that we are unsure as to whether human 
society as such is a good thing”. What this means is that the value judgment and the 
social aspect is still present – but only in the present. Because, by this logic, social 
betterment, somewhat paradoxically, appears as the end of the social. And the end of 
the social, by entailment, spells the end of values and thus the end of utopia, meaning 
that, ultimately, the future in which humans are absent is not the future of utopia but 
the future of its absence.
The biological disappearance of humans rather evidently entails the 
disappearance of the values associated with social, cultural, and political modes 
of human existence, and the latter happens because the former does. This is the 
sense in which the prospect of human extinction is primarily concerned with what we 
understand as a biological species. And if extinction happens and the world without us 
comes into being, that world will be neither human, nor biocultural in our very human 
understanding; it will simply be indifferent to our categories. So, to ask the question for 
the last time: can that prospect of a world indifferent to us and our values nevertheless 
be utopian?
THESIS 3: WE EITHER CONSIDER HUMAN EXTINCTION 
AS A PROSPECT DEVOID OF UTOPIANISM AND THUS WE 
CONSIDER IT AS VALUE-FREE, OR WE PROJECT OUR 
UTOPIAN VALUES OVER THE PROSPECT OF THE WORLD 
AND THUS WE LEVEL UP OUR ANTHROPOCENTRISM
Let me begin with the first half of this third thesis. It is the default option that 
follows from the two preceding theses. It states that, in principle, the prospect of 
human extinction cannot be utopian. For it is simply the prospect of the end of the 
social world, the end of the social understanding of the human, and the end of human 
values. Our values, our social imaginaries, and our utopian drives die out with our 
biological dying out.
As the future without us is a future without social content and without our values, 
it can hardly be considered in terms attuned to capturing a social constitution. The 
world without us, in that respect, is just like the world before us. The same way we 
tend to think of the latter as the pre-social world, we should think of the former as a 
post-social one, while both are simply non-social worlds. It may very well be that some 
of us think about a pre-social world nostalgically in idyllic terms, and so the post-social 
world may appear the same. But precisely because they belong to the same family, the 
post-social world defies utopianism just as much as the pre-social one. The same way 
that we do not think of pre-social idyllic fantasies as utopian but as nostalgic, we have 
no reasons to think of post-social imaginaries is such terms. At best, they appear as 
objects of nostalgia projected to the future.
Yet there may be a crucial difference between the pre-social and the post-social. 
Unlike in the pre-social past, the material remains of human societies will be part of 
the post-social future, up to certain points of various timelines, indicating a world that 
was once a social one. But to whom exactly is the previous existence of a social world 
Esboços, Florianópolis, v. 27, n. 46, p. 377-389, set./dez. 2020.
ISSN 2175-7976 DOI https://doi.org/10.5007/2175-7976.2020.e72517
385/623
Utopia without us?
indicated? For us in the present until we still exist, but certainly not to the inhabitants 
of the natural world without us as we imagine it (and, for a moment, let’s bracket how 
humans are part of the “100 Percent-Natural Club,” as Timothy LeCain (2017) likes to 
phrase it). In the absence of the societies and the social beings that produced those 
remains and would be able to recognize them as such, they will simply form the natural 
world just like everything else.
 That's about the rather straightforward first half of the answer. The second half 
is far more ambivalent. For even if there is no reason to think about human extinction 
on the basis of our existing notions of utopia, nothing prevents anyone from filling the 
prospect of the world without us with social content and values. I cannot prevent it even 
if I wanted to. Nor will the future of human extinction protest, being short of beings, 
who, to our current knowledge, would comprehend utopian values.
In defence of viewing human extinction as utopian, one can argue that, from 
our present point of view, being embedded in social worlds of value judgements, we 
typically look at the future in terms of values, regardless of what futures we imagine. 
We only need to extend the scope of our existing notions of utopia and value judgement 
and ask the question of whether, as Vieira put it, human societies as such are good. 
One could argue that the distinctive features of a new kind of (what can be called) 
extinction-utopia is precisely that it escapes the socio-political domain: when the whole 
idea of socio-political betterment is compromised, the only betterment option left is to 
do away with the societal once and for all.
To avoid misunderstandings, I do not wish to advocate these views. But their 
actual existence needs to be noted, despite the fact of devoting this essay to an 
argument aiming to show that such views are illogical and self-contradictory. To be as 
clear as possible, my view is that Anthropocene prospects of both societal collapse and 
human extinction belong to the category of what I call “posthistorical dystopia” (SIMON, 
2019, p. 93-103), that is, the prospect of an immense transformation that is no longer 
“historical” in the sense modern societies typically thought about change over time. 
Such prospects are posthistorical inasmuch as they are expected to be brought about 
by the outburst of a transformative event, instead of arriving at them over the course of 
a developmental historical process, be that development considered to be progressive 
or regressive. As to their dystopian character, the evental transformation they trigger are 
inherently dystopian inasmuch as the change they entail are cognitively inaccessible to 
human beings. I call the type of change “unprecedented change” (SIMON, 2019), and 
the event that triggers such change an “epochal event” (SIMON, 2020).
Even today’s science is informed by such structural expectations of immense 
transformative changes. If we turn from literary and cinematic imaginaries to what 
Earth system science says, then we are left without vivid descriptions and with far more 
uncertainties. We invest less in picturing post-apocalyptic circumstances and more in 
conceding that we have no concrete idea about what follows once the Earth system 
is being pushed beyond “tipping points” (LENTON, 2011) and crosses “planetary 
boundaries” (ROCKSTRÖM et al., 2009), abruptly transitioning to conditions we 
cannot fathom. In my view, it is the very unfathomability and cognitive inaccessibility 
that necessarily renders our recent visions of the future inherently dystopian (even 
those with utopian content such as transhumanism).
The above full disclosure is necessary for addressing the last inconsistency 
one can detect in utopian interpretations of the world without us. To make the self-
contradictory nature of a utopia without us visible, I want to measure it against 
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posthistorical dystopia with respect to their ultimate concerns. On the one side, 
considering Anthropocene futures in terms of posthistorical dystopia means that the 
prospects are ours in the sense that they are concerned with the fate of humanity. 
On the other, seeing the world without us as utopian is concerned with the fate of 
the planet, after the fate of humanity is settled. Whereas the former view clearly and 
admittedly retains an extent of human-centeredness, in the case of the latter the 
question arises: whose utopia would that be, then?
Despite being human prospects, extinction-utopias aim at a viewpoint that 
escapes human-centeredness. They appeal to a planetary point of view instead, 
with a broadly defined “life” at their centre. The world without us appears as utopian 
because it claims to occupy the hypothetical viewpoint of the entirety of the natural 
world and the greater planetary scheme of “life” that the particular human lifeforms 
only seem to damage. Either accidentally or deliberately, this appeal coincides with 
the current trend in the humanities and the social sciences to develop post- anti- and 
non-anthropocentric views (CRIST; KOPNINA, 2014; DOMANSKA, 2019) that intend 
to overcome ideas of human exceptionalism and the view that the human lifeform is 
superior to other lifeforms.
 That said, the utmost irony of projecting utopianism over the prospect of the world 
without us is precisely that it is profoundly anthropocentric in another sense. Perhaps 
even more anthropocentric than the admittedly human-centered view that attempts 
to avoid human extinction. Without arguing either for or against anthropocentrism, 
the only thing I wish to point out is that utopianism about human extinction scales 
up our anthropocentric drive in defining even the world of human non-existence in 
terms of our very human values. In other words, the prospect of a utopia without us 
appeals to become a non-anthropocentric worldview on the profoundly anthropocentric 
assumption of retaining a human superiority in investing the world with meaning even 
for the world characterized by the absence of humans. It conveys the sense that we 
know better – or perhaps that we simply know the best – about what’s good for other 
lifeforms of the planet, for the planet itself, and, well, perhaps even for the universe (by 
entailment). In the guise of non-anthropocentrism, we get intensified anthropocentrism.
All in all, the final answer to the question whether there can be a utopia without 
us is as follows: no, not in the sense of our existing notions of utopia. Although the 
possibility of redefining the term and extending its scope can be retained, extinction-
utopianism defies its own premises by scaling up human exceptionalism and reinforcing 
the very attitudes it intends to overcome.
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